Research on target: A collaboration between researchers and practitioners for a target hardening scheme by Wellsmith, Melanie & Birks, Daniel
University of Huddersfield Repository
Wellsmith, Melanie and Birks, Daniel
Research on target: A collaboration between researchers and practitioners for a target hardening 
scheme
Original Citation
Wellsmith, Melanie and Birks, Daniel (2008) Research on target: A collaboration between 
researchers and practitioners for a target hardening scheme. International Review of Law, 
Computers and Technology, 22 (1). pp. 181-189. ISSN 1360-0869
This version is available at http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/9526/
The University Repository is a digital collection of the research output of the
University, available on Open Access. Copyright and Moral Rights for the items
on this site are retained by the individual author and/or other copyright owners.
Users may access full items free of charge; copies of full text items generally
can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any
format or medium for personal research or study, educational or not-for-profit
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided:
• The authors, title and full bibliographic details is credited in any copy;
• A hyperlink and/or URL is included for the original metadata page; and
• The content is not changed in any way.
For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please
contact the Repository Team at: E.mailbox@hud.ac.uk.
http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/
Authors’ draft – please do not circulate or quote without permission 
1 
 
Authors: Wellsmith, M and Birks, D.J. 
 
Title: Research on Target: A collaboration between researchers and practitioners for a target 
hardening scheme 
 
This paper discusses a crime prevention initiative in which an academic research team was involved 
from the outset until the final evaluation.  It is reported here to illustrate both the ways in which 
researchers can work with practitioners to produce evidence-led responses to crime problems and to 
highlight a number of issues worthy of consideration for others working in this way.  First, we briefly 
describe the project and the analysis which led to its formation.  This is of particular interest as it 
involved incorporating a fairly new crime concept into a prevention scheme.  We also consider the 
degree to which the research team was involved in the project, as it moved through several stages, 
and provide an overview of our evaluation of the scheme.  Next, we discuss the value of and issues 
surrounding such collaborations and finally we raise a number of points in the form of 




From 2002, the authors were involved in a research collaboration which was formed to assist a Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) in the West Midlands region of England to achieve its 
Public Service Agreement targets in crime reduction.  The area in question was considered a highly 
deprived borough.1  The 2001 Census showed the borough had a similar age and gender profile to 
England and Wales as a whole, but a higher proportion of minority ethnic groups.  It further recorded a 
slightly higher unemployment rate than the average, as well as fewer owner-occupied households.  
The initial focus for the research team was domestic burglary.  In 2002/03, the police recorded rate for 
domestic burglary in the borough was 29.6 offences per 1,000 households,2 compared to a national 
rate of 20 for the same period.3  The research team identified, from police recorded crime data, 
several high number, high rate ‘priority’ neighbourhoods.4  Interviews were carried out with police 
crime prevention officers responsible for these neighbourhoods and a number of reports were 
produced to advise the CDRP Burglary Task Group (BTG) on the extent and nature of the problem,5 
as well as providing a menu of possible reduction measures, predominantly drawing on the situational 
crime prevention literature,6 which included cross-cutting, borough wide approaches and a matrix of 
options tailored for each of the high priority neighbourhoods.7 
 
Subsequent to these reports and discussions between the BTG and the researchers, the following 
options were chosen as key to achieving the greatest reduction in domestic burglary, across the 
greatest number of households at risk: 
 
• Focusing on repeat victims of domestic burglary.8  
• Providing a free-to-user target hardening scheme.9 
 
It was felt that both of these aims could be combined into a single scheme which offered free home 
security surveys and ‘target hardening’ style upgrades to all repeat victims (those reporting a second 
offence within 12 months of a prior offence) across the borough and all households reporting a single 
burglary in the priority neighbourhoods (which, by this point, had been slightly expanded to allow each 
town in the area to be represented).   
 
At the same time, one of the authors was using local police data to test for the presence of near 
repeats, a method which had been recently proposed by Johnson and Bowers10 and Townsley et al.11  
Initial results suggested that the concept held both in the borough as a whole and within many of the 
individual neighbourhoods.  That is to say, in many of the small areas being studied, there was an 
increased risk of burglary for those premises that were geographically close to ones which had already 
been burgled.  This risk was temporally bounded, being greatest when closest in time to the recorded 
offence.  The degree to which this was the case and the distance and time within which risk was 
heightened could be determined from historic data for each neighbourhood and a risk ‘profile’ 
produced [?DAN?].  It was felt that there would be scope to build the findings of this work into the 
proposed target hardening scheme, allowing the service to be offered proactively to households at 
increased risk of near repeats within the priority neighbourhoods. 
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A social housing agency with a local presence successfully tendered to produce a bid with the CDRP 
for Neighbourhood Renewal funding to support such a scheme for two years.  The programme 
officially started in early July 2004.  The reactive service (offered to those reporting a burglary to the 
police) was expanded to cover the whole borough.  The proactive service, whilst focusing on the 
priority neighbourhoods, was allowed to consider locations outside these, thus adapting to the crime 
profile as it shifted over time.  The agency administering the scheme contacted all burglary victims 
who had agreed for their details to be passed on.  Those who accepted the service were provided with 
a home security survey and offered free upgrades or repairs where these were identified as being 
necessary to reduce their risk of further burglary.  This would often cover such things as the addition of 
window locks and improved door locks.  Where it was deemed necessary, hinge bolts, peep holes and 
the like were fitted and, in some extreme cases, doors, windows or fencing was repaired or replaced.  
Crime prevention advice was also given and householders were encouraged to keep their premises 
secure. 
 
Proactive visits were identified differently.  Every few months the research team would use the latest 
burglary data to assess those areas at greatest risk of near repeats.  These were narrowed down to a 
manageable number of streets and all the houses in that area were leafleted by the agency.  Those 
householders who contacted them were then offered the same survey and upgrade service as that 
received by burglary victims.  In both reactive and proactive cases, the service was entirely free of 
charge, regardless of the means of the householder or the status of their occupancy (i.e. tenant, 
owner-occupier, etc.). 
 
Due to the nature of the project, there was a good deal of communication between the researchers, 
the project team and the BTG.  To facilitate this further, a project steering group was established with 
at least one representative from these three bodies.  In addition, a number of other interested parties 
(such as the local authority repairs manager) often attended. 
 
As with many such schemes, over the almost two years of its life the way in which it was run varied.  
In fact, it went through a number of stages from the initial set-up and feet finding, through an 
established and then self-managed scheme, to the point where it began to deviate from the original 
approach until it was completed in its original form and evolved into a sustainable, albeit slightly 
different, programme.  As researchers, we were most heavily involved during the earlier stages and 
continued to feed information on proactive areas through the middle stages.  We were effectively 
‘phased out’ during the latter stages as our funding changed and the scheme began to self-manage 
‘risk’ identification.  Whilst we provided proactive lists there was a request by the project workers to 
reduce the frequency of these so as to increase the time spent in any one area.  This did not satisfy 
the original, short-lived proactive risk criteria and was partly a result of our reduced involvement.  
Finally, the proactive element of the scheme deviated from this original method and switched to a ‘five-
a-side’ approach, whereby the service was offered to five houses on either side of a burgled property 
receiving a reactive upgrade.  Had we been in a position to do so, we would have advised against this 
approach, but our contribution had all but ceased by this point.   
 
During the life of the scheme we produced two interim reports on the status of the project (at the 
completion of 500 and 1,000 upgrades) and a final evaluation.12  The two earlier reports were 
produced to satisfy the requests of the BTG for an interim evaluation, which the research team did not 
believe was appropriate.  Instead, we focused these analyses on the proportion of burglaries, the 
demographics of occupiers and the work carried out at premises which were upgraded.  These reports 
proved to be more useful than we had anticipated as they highlighted a number of issues.  Most 
notably, some of the data needed for the final evaluation was not being recorded.  Moreover, a 
number of one-off initiatives had been carried out, which may have skewed the profile of households 
being target hardened away from those most at risk in favour of older people, who were incorrectly 
perceived as more vulnerable. 
 
The project evaluation was carried out immediately after the project ended which, as researchers, we 
found less than desirable.  However, the BTG hoped to continue running the scheme under a slightly 
different guise and needed to know if it had been ‘successful’ or not.  With no follow-up period and 
significant time constraints, we approached the evaluation from a number of angles in order to provide 
the best picture possible of the effects of its operation.13  These were: 
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• A time series approach, comparing the monthly count of offences over a period of 40 months 
to see how burglaries fluctuated over time, not simply for a total period before and during the 
project. 
• A quasi-experimental approach, using the ‘rest of force area’ as a control.14  This control was 
not truly comparable in terms of a matched profile, nor was it devoid of any intervention. 
• A ‘realistic’ approach,15 where the context of the project, the mechanisms by which it was 
expected to have an effect and the outcomes this would produce were considered, albeit 
briefly. 
 
It can be seen from the points made above that the latter two methods were not applied in what we 
would consider an ideal way.  Further, despite requesting that all the necessary data be recorded, this 
was not done in a manner which allowed us to produce a comparison group of those being offered the 
proactive service but not taking it.  At the same time, we could only identify those who had the reactive 
service and those who did not, we could not determine why this was the case, or even if it had been 
offered to every burglary victim.  With these limitations in mind, the evaluation simply aimed to 
determine whether the project had led to a reduction in the number of dwelling burglaries recorded in 
the borough and whether it had led to fewer people being repeat victims of such an offence.  The 
results were varied, but overall it was felt that the scheme had been a success.  To summarise, we 
found that: 
 
• During the period July 2004 to March 2006, there were 1,137 reactive upgrades and 4,221 
proactive upgrades carried out under the scheme.  We estimated (due to difficulties with the 
data) that between 28 and 41 per cent of burglary victims received a reactive visit and that 
around four and a half per cent of the households in the borough had been visited either 
reactively or proactively during the period studied. 
• There were significantly fewer recorded domestic burglaries in the borough during the 20 
months the scheme was in operation than in the 20 months prior to this.  However, this 
decrease had begun some time before the project started and offences seemed merely to 
level out during the period it was running. 
• Compared to the ‘control’ area the decrease in domestic burglaries in the project borough was 
greater and the proportion of such offences occurring in this borough was lower for the period 
the project was running (there was, of course, no follow-up period) 
• The victimisation rate for those receiving any type of upgrade was lower than the overall 
estimated victimisation rate for the borough. 
• The ‘repeat’ victimisation rate for those receiving a reactive upgrade (i.e. those already 
burgled) was considerably lower than the rate of ‘repeat’ victimisation for all burgled 
households.16 
• The necessary data and post-project period required to carry out an effective evaluation were 
not available.17 
 
We concluded, therefore, that it was not possible to identify the contribution the project had made to 
the recorded decrease in burglaries in the borough, but that the comparative victimisation rates 
suggested the project should: “…be seen as a success, contributing towards a reduction in dwelling 
burglaries.”18  Those properties which had been upgraded had a lower burglary rate than the general 
population of the borough, despite the fact they would have previously been at greater risk by virtue of 
already having been burgled or being near such a property.19  Within the described constraints, it was 
not possible to determine the mechanism(s) operating during the programme.  At a micro-level, these 
may have been the perceived increase in effort and risk to the offender as a result of: more secure 
properties (target hardening and property marking); the presence of project workers in high risk areas 
(surveillance); and/or an increased awareness and caution of householders visited under the scheme 
(surveillance and guardianship).20  On a wider, scale, there is an argument that crime rates, including 
for domestic burglary, have been dropping for many years and the decreases seen in both the 
recorded crime statistics and the British Crime Survey in recent years are simply a continuation of this 
trend which would have occurred regardless of crime prevention activity or crime and disorder 
legislation.21  Whilst this is not the subject of this paper, we did find that decreases in domestic 
burglary in the borough studied were greater than in the rest of the force area.  Although the evidence 
to refute this argument is not provided here, the technological and social changes which are 
acknowledged as contributing to this long-term decline, can be seen to include security and target 
hardening techniques or devices.22 
 




The evaluation was delivered in the form of a final report and a presentation to the BTG.  The results 
appeared to be well received, although media announcements had already been made - without the 
benefit of any evaluation - that the scheme had reduced burglary in the area.  As a research team, we 
were generally pleased with how our findings and suggestions had been put into practice.  We had 
been frustrated by the need to ‘water down’ the proactive element of the scheme and, even more so, 
by the missing data which hampered our ability to carry out a more thorough evaluation.  Overall, 
however, the collaboration appeared to have been reasonably successful and we took a number of 




The main purpose of this paper is to consider the benefits of researcher-practitioner collaborations as 
experienced in the reported project.  There has been much discussion in the field of crime and crime 
prevention of evidence-based policy23 and ‘what works’,24 but less often do we see published work 
exemplifying such a close working relationship as described here.  Such commissions are, of course, 
carried out, both by academic institutions (universities) and other experienced organisations (such as 
Crime Concern) and consultancies.  We believe it is rare, however, for the research team to continue 
working with and advising the practitioner team from the conceptual to evaluation stages.  
 
Evidence-led policy (and policy-focused research) requires the sharing of information between policy-
makers (or practitioners) and the research community.  Although this should be a two-way relationship 
it is often difficult to achieve.25  Despite the proliferation of the internet and the various toolkits and 
publications of bodies such as the Home Office, it would appear that at least some of those involved in 
auditing, tackling and prevent crime still do not know where to find this information or, perhaps more 
ominously, what to do with it.26  The wheel continues to be re-invented.  Whilst there remains, 
therefore, more than enough scope for ‘pure’ academic research and policy-oriented work, we believe 
that more research-practice collaborations can help narrow this information gap, by bringing evidence 
directly to those people who need to use it, ensuring it is locally relevant and assisting practitioners in 
applying it appropriately. 
 
There are, of course, a number of practical issues which make this proposal less simple than it may 
seem.  We now consider, from the experience reported here, some of these possible considerations. 
 
Funding 
Academic research is reliant on funding, with the majority of research posts being for a fixed-term and 
the result of a successful bid, usually to a research council or, perhaps, a charity.  Academic research 
is also expensive; certainly in terms of the funds available to CDRPs (and, to a lesser extent, police 
forces and local authorities).  We were in a very fortunate position in that the CDRP with whom we 
worked (for two years) had been able to secure funding for this dedicated academic research facility 
and the research team was housed by West Midlands Police and further supported by the local area 
Drug Action Team and Government Office West Midlands.  Such funding will not always be readily 
available.  Indeed, despite the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) stating that research 
should be “…of value to potential users outside or within the research community”,27 published lists of 
successful bids rarely include crime research, let alone that which appears to be policy or practice 
oriented.28  A more likely source of support for such research may be the Home Office, but the 
majority of crime prevention research published by them refers to after the fact evaluations, often of 
schemes for which they have provided the funding.29  Obtaining funding is, therefore, the first 
stumbling block to be addressed and some lateral thinking may be required. 
 
Time-scales 
Another issue which arose during this project was the disparity between operational, quick time 
analysis and what could be thought of as academic thoroughness.  When funding is available to 
practitioners, there is often limited time to develop a project on which it can be spent.  Therefore, initial 
analysis needs a short turnaround time.  Realistically, this is likely to mean a collaboration will already 
have to be in place.  In other situations where we have worked with practitioners or policy makers, we 
have negotiated a period of time for the researcher which is acceptable to both parties and still allows 
for a thorough analysis of the data.  As with any research, not all the analyses need be included in the 
final report and the focus can, and probably will, be different to any publications one may wish to 
produce. 




During the running of the project, practitioners may also require interim research to be carried out; 
both ensuring the project is ‘on track’ and that the problem is still being addressed in the most 
appropriate way (such as the right geographical area being targeted).  This process proved very useful 
during our project and can be a good way to iron out any data issues which may affect the final 
evaluation.  Such reports usually require caveats, however, so that they are not seen as more than 
they intend to be.  Researchers will need to build in the capacity to produce such reports, which are 
valuable to: 
 
• the project team - to ensure things are working as they should and to provide reassurance  
• the scheme as a whole - as new intervention targets can be highlighted should the crime 
profile have altered and to highlight any process related issues that need addressing 
• the research team - to ‘test’ the suitability of the data being collected for future evaluation, to 
provide an overview of how the scheme is being operated and to allow a method for re-
iterating the theoretical and evidentiary impetus of the project. 
 
Data Access 
A key consideration for any researcher is data.  For those of us who predominantly use secondary 
analysis, this means securing a source.  Whilst some data are freely available for criminological 
research,30 much of what we do requires access to other organisations’ datasets, such as crime 
recorded by the police.  There is much debate about what such data can be said to represent,31 but it 
remains a fact that much research into crime phenomena could not take place without secondary 
analysis and the use of police data.32  Covering the period which included the discussed project, the 
research team was physically based in a police station with access to networked computers.  In order 
to facilitate our research, all members of the team were security cleared by the Force to what was 
considered a satisfactory level.  A high-ranking officer was responsible for overseeing the projects we 
worked on and agreeing our access to data for this purpose. 
 
Usually police data is provided to researchers at some level of aggregation or with key individual 
details removed.  When working towards a prevention project with practitioners, more detailed 
information may be required.  For example, when producing the interim reports we needed to know 
the age, gender and individual addresses of those who had been burgled and those who had received 
the target hardening service.  We further needed individual address and crime records for the 
evaluation.  This process was facilitated by the prior agreement on data access and our research 
location.  Establishing a suitable data protocol should be a key consideration for any researcher 
embarking upon such a collaboration.  This can be difficult, but our experience suggests that it is 
certainly possible and to the benefit of all those involved. 
 
Publication 
The practitioners and funders we have worked with have been supportive of our desire to publish our 
research in academic journals, but this may not always be the case, particularly if the paper is critical 
or appears to show those involved in a negative light.  Where the funding has been obtained from an 
academic research source, there should be an assumption of the right to publish.  When the research 
is commissioned and, therefore, funded by the other party to the collaboration, this cannot be taken for 
granted.  We would suggest that such issues should be established at the outset of any collaboration 
or project with, for example, an agreement on who to seek permission from, a timeframe within which 
decisions will be made and, where possible, a statement that publication will be allowed except in 
certain, specified circumstances, most usually related to operational sensitivity or data protection.  
Careful wording, protection of identities and adopting an appropriate focus for the paper should 
normally prevent any refusals.  As alluded to above, the way in which an academic paper is written 
and its main proposals are likely to be different to that required in a report to the project team; what is 
useful operationally may be different to what is useful for policy, which may also be different to what is 
of interest academically.  Researchers should build in time for producing these different reports and 
construct them appropriately.  There is obviously a duty to the practitioner partners to ensure the 
project reports receive due commitment. 
 
Evaluation 
As we worked throughout the project as part of the steering group, we were in an excellent position to 
carry out the final evaluation.  As an external evaluator it can often be difficult to ascertain exactly how 
the programme worked.  Further, if the theoretical impetus or aims of the project have not been clearly 
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defined it can be nigh on impossible to measure its success.  Eliciting this information is particularly 
important when carrying out a realistic evaluation and may involve interviews with key informers, who 
may be subjects, practitioners or stakeholders.33  Often intervention programmes will evolve during 
their lifetime and this may confound the evaluation if such changes are not communicated.  These 
were not problems for us, although we still faced some issues with the availability and appropriateness 
of data. 
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that we were in the worst position to evaluate the project as we 
were too involved in its conception and operation.  Had it been a full evaluation, this would probably be 
the case.  However, we did not attempt to assess the successfulness of the proactive identification 
method, simply whether the project, as a whole, had contributed to a reduction in burglaries and 
repeat victimisation.  In this way, we were able to remain objective whilst taking advantage of our 
‘insider knowledge’ of how the project worked.  We would suggest, therefore, that unless an innovative 
or novel research finding is being applied - and thus tested - by the intervention, it is perfectly possible, 
with the correct balance of detachment and reflexivity for a researcher involved in the project to carry 
out an evaluation. 
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